Abstract. There is a scalability gap between probabilistic and nonprobabilistic verification. Probabilistic model checking tools are based either on explicit engines or on (Multi-Terminal) Binary Decision Diagrams. These structures are complemented in areas of non-probabilistic verification by more scalable techniques, such as IC3. We present a symbolic probabilistic model checking algorithm based on IC3-like incremental construction of inductive clauses to partition the state space, interleaved with incremental construction of a system of linear inequalities. This paper compares our implementation to standard quantitative verification alternatives: our experiments show that our algorithm is a step to more scalable symbolic verification of rare events in finite-state Markov chains.
Introduction
Probabilistic model checking is a formal verification method used to obtain guarantees of correctness for models of real life systems that exhibit probabilistic behaviour. Current verification engines based on sparse matrices, BDDs, and MTBDDs are fast but scalability is dependent on the structure of the model [15] . In non-probabilistic verification recent SAT/SMT-based engines, such as Craig interpolation [18] or IC3 [4] , complement BDD-based model checking; whilst often slower, these engines are able to tackle some models where BDDs require too much memory. This paper presents an algorithm for the analysis of probabilistic safety/reachability properties based on incrementally constructing inductive invariants, a principle introduced in IC3 [4] , and incrementally constructing a system of linear inequalities.
IC3 is a SAT-based, yet complete, algorithm that computes an over-approximation of the set of reachable states in the form of an inductive invariant that implies a safety property. One of the challenges in applying inductive invariants to probabilistic properties is that there is no direct equivalent of this invariant for probabilistic safety properties, since these are properties that depend on multiple execution paths rather than just reachable states. In other words, a counterexample for a non-probabilistic safety property is any single path from the initial state to the unsafe states; a counter-example for a probabilistic safety property is a group of paths from the initial to the unsafe states with an accrued probability greater than a specified threshold. Existing work uses SMT techniques to produce counter-examples for probabilistic systems as sets of paths [6] , or as minimal critical subsystems [19] , but these techniques are based on Bounded Model Checking(BMC). There are several advantages to using IC3 over BMC [8] : first it is only necessary to unroll the transition relation one step; second, the incremental construction of invariants allows it to make much more effective use of incremental SAT solving than BMC; and finally the reasoning in IC3 is localised and driven by the property being checked. We exploit a by-product of IC3's invariant construction to incrementally build a system of linear inequalities based on the set of Danger States, defined as the set of states that may eventually lead to a violation of the safety property (i.e., reach the unsafe state). This is an over-approximation of the minimal critical subsystem. The system of linear inequalities represents upper and lower bounds on the probability of violating the safety property for states in this set. At each iteration of the algorithm, we check whether these are sufficient to decide the validity of the property.
The technical contributions in this paper are: -In Section 3 we present an algorithm for verifying reachability properties in Markov chains, which uses incrementally constructed inductive invariants to partition the state space and incrementally constructs a system of linear inequalities bounding the reachability probability. We use SMT techniques to establish whether the reachability probability falls within the acceptable range or not. We call our algorithm pIC3, as it is a probabilistic model checking technique inspired by IC3. -We prove the soundness and termination of the algorithm in Appendix A.
-In Section 5 we describe the implementation of pIC3, and explore its scalability. We find that the scalability of pIC3 is dependent on the number of Danger States in the model, and that pIC3 can verify rare-events on models where PRISM fails.
Background

Discrete Time Markov Chains
The probabilistic transition systems we will consider are given as Discrete Time Markov Chains (DTMC) [3] . We consider symbolic DTMCs represented as follows:
, where -x = {x 0 , ..., x n } is a finite set of Boolean state variables. Each complete assignment of Boolean variables corresponds to a single state, s. We denote a single state s and its valuation x by s(x): e.g., for x = {x 0 , x 1 } and s = ¬x 0 ∧ x 1 , we denote the state by s(01). -we write x ′ to denote the set of next state Boolean variables. Applying prime to a formula F is the same as applying prime to all of its variables.
-I(x) is a predicate over the state variables, representing the initial states.
We assume only one initial state, but will outline an extension to multiple initial states in Section 7.
-T (x, x ′ ) is a transition relation over a set of state variables x, that holds if there is a transition from x to x ′ . -P (x, x ′ ) maps a transition to a probability in [0, 1], e.g., P (x 0 ∧¬x 1 , ¬x 0 ∧x 1 ) gives the probability of a transition occurring from the state given by x 0 ∧¬x 1 to the state given by ¬x 0 ∧ x 1 3 . If x or x ′ are not full assignments, P maps several transitions to the same probability, allowing symbolic storage of the transition probabilities. If a state s(x) has any incoming or outgoing transition, i.e., there exists a satisfying assignment to T ∧ s or T ∧ s ′ , the outgoing transition probabilities of the state must sum to 1.
It is not strictly necessary to define both T (x, x ′ ) and P (x, x ′ ), as T (x, x ′ ) evaluates to true if P (x, x ′ ) > 0, and to false otherwise. Retaining both is practical for implementation purposes. We use S to denote the finite state-space, which is the set of all possible complete valuations of x.
We will describe our method using a small example transition system, illustrated in Figure 2 . However, our algorithm is designed to handle transition systems that are too large to be practically represented explicitly. The example has two state variables, x 1 and x 2 , and we represent each possible combination as an explicit state encoded with s(x 1 x 2 ). The property is φ = ¬x 1 ∨ ¬x 2 and the initial states are given by I = ¬x 1 ∧ ¬x 2 .
Probabilistic safety properties
We consider unbounded horizon safety properties with a probabilistic bound, e.g., the probability of reaching a failure state must be less than y. Formally, we write P <y [♦¬φ | I], where y ∈ [0, 1], ¬φ is a predicate over the state variables that represents the set of failure states, and I is the set of initial states. By abuse of notation we use P <y [♦¬φ] to denote this property starting from the initial states.
Property as path probabilities A probabilistic safety property is evaluated by considering all finite paths that originate in an initial state and finish in a failure state, and finding the sum of the probabilities for each of those paths occurring. We call these path fragments Danger Paths. The property P <y [♦¬φ|I], can be written in terms of the sum of probabilities of each of the Danger Paths occurring.
A Danger Path is defined as a finite path that starts in the initial state, and eventually leads to a failure state, i.e., it satisfies ♦¬φ,
The probability of a finite path of length n, ω n f in occurring, P r(ω n f in ), is defined as:
3 In this work we use P to denote transition probabilities, P r to denote probabilities associated to paths, and P (·) for the probabilistic operator in PCTL formulae.
Now our property can be written in terms of the sum of the path probabilities for all the Danger Paths: P r[♦¬φ | I] = ∀ω f in |=♦¬φ P r(ω f in ). Note that, for the Danger Paths, ω(0), ..., ω(i − 1) ∈ (Post * (I) ∩ Pre * (¬φ)).
Bounds on path probabilities
We use the notation U p (s) to denote an upper bound for the P r[♦¬φ | s], i.e., an upper bound on the probability of reaching a ¬φ state starting from s. We use L p (s) to denote a lower bound for the P r[♦¬φ | s], i.e, a lower bound on the probability of reaching a ¬φ state starting from s.
IC3
IC3 [4] proves or refutes safety properties by incrementally constructing an inductive invariant that implies φ. It does this by building a series of frames, i.e., sets of states that over-approximate the states reachable within 0, ..., k steps. IC3 removes states in the frames that can reach ¬φ, known as counterexamples to induction (CTIs), and proves or disproves their reachability in a backwardsearch fashion. It continues this process until it either finds a counterexample path from the initial states to ¬φ or until it obtains a frame closed under the transition relation, in which all states satisfy the property. By this technique IC3 avoids the explicit unrolling of the transition relation that is required by bounded model checking and explicit reachability analysis.
Conjunctive Normal Form and Frames A formula is in conjunctive normal form (CNF) if it is a conjunction of clauses, where each clause, c, is a disjunction of literals. IC3 tightly integrates with a propositional SAT solver, which requires Boolean formula in CNF. A frame F is a formula in conjunctive normal form that represents a set of states in the state space, i.e., F i ⊆ S, and is a conjunction of multiple clauses.
Induction A frame F is an inductive invariant for a transition system S if I =⇒ F and F ∧ T =⇒ F ′ , i.e, if all initial states are covered by F and F is closed under the transition relation. A clause c is inductive relative to a frame F if both I =⇒ c and F ∧ T ∧ c =⇒ c ′ .
Post and Pre
We use the notation Post n (s) for the set of states that are reachable from s within n steps using transitions in T , and Post * (s) for the set of states that are reachable from s using transitions in T . Similarly, we use the notation Pre n (s) for the set of states that can reach s within n steps using transitions in T , and Pre * (s) for the set of states that can reach s using transitions in T [3] .
Paths A path through a DTMC is a sequence of states s 0 s 1 s 2 s 3 ..., starting from an initial state, such that ∀i. P (s i , s i+1 ) > 0, and represents an execution of the system that the DTMC models. We denote a path by ω, and a finite path by ω fin , and Paths(s) (Paths fin (s)) is the set of all infinite (finite) paths in the DTMC D starting from state s. We use ω(i) to denote the i th state in a path.
Our Algorithm (pIC3)
We have noted in Section 2.2 that a probabilistic reachability property can be expressed in terms of the sum of the path probabilities of all Danger Paths, and that all Danger Paths are contained within Post * (I) ∩ Pre * (¬φ). PIC3 therefore incrementally (by introducing and refining successive frames F 0 , ..., F n ) identifies three sets of states within the state space, shown in Figure 1 :
-Safe States, which are states from which ¬φ cannot be reached; -Danger States, which are states in φ that may reach states in ¬φ. This set includes, at termination, Post * (I) ∩ Pre * (¬φ), i.e., all the Danger Paths. After the nth frame has been added, Danger States includes Post n (I) ∩ Pre n (¬φ), i.e., all the Danger Paths of length n or less.
We begin with a state space specified by state variables, and the states that violate the property are identified by the boolean formula ¬φ. We symbolically partition out the Safe States by incrementally constructing inductive invariants, and we identify Danger States as the states in φ, but not in Safe States. After each frame is added pIC3 checks whether the system of linear inequalities we have so far constructed from states found so far in Danger States is sufficient to prove or refute the property.
To improve efficiency, we store only a partial explicit list of Danger States, namely only the CTIs explicitly identified by the SAT solver calls, from which we construct the system of linear inequalities, and we make SMT calls to check whether the system of linear inequalities contains enough information to prove or refute the property. We increase the number of states and transitions in this explicit list and system of linear inequalities until we can prove or refute the property. Note that, although the SAT solver returns explicit instances of Danger States and we store this explicit list, we in fact make a generalisation about each explicit state and remove both the state and a group of similar states from Safe States. Thus Danger States is composed of two parts: the explicit list, plus the symbolically handled set φ \ Safe States. The two key processes of pIC3, that are interleaved, are:
-we partition the state space symbolically, by incrementally constructing inductive invariants; -we incrementally collect information about the probability of the Danger Paths, and the algorithm terminates when we have collected the minimum information that is sufficient to prove or refute the given property P >y [♦¬φ].
In this section we will first give an overview of the partitioning out of the Safe States, and relate this back to the original IC3 algorithm. Then we will explain the Danger States collection and system of linear inequalities, and how it interleaves into the state-space partioning. Finally, we will explain how, after discovery of new Danger States, we make decisions about the decidability of the property based on system of linear inequalities constructed so far. A block diagram of the algorithm is given in Figure 5 . The full pseudo-code is found in Appendix A.
Partitioning out Safe States
IC3 generates an invariant that implies a property φ by constructing sets of states, called frames, F 0 , ..., F k ⊆ S, that are over-approximations of states reachable within 0, ..., k steps. It terminates when it finds a path that leads from the initial state to ¬φ, in which case the property does not hold, or when it reaches a frame that is closed under the transition relation and does not contain a state in ¬φ. In this case the property holds, and the frame is an invariant that implies the property. IC3 builds the frames by starting with the largest possible over-approximation for a frame, and then uses a SAT solver to find counterexamples to this as an invariant that implies the property, i.e., states in the frame that have a transition that leads to ¬φ in one step. For each frame, it removes any of these states, returned by the SAT solver, by adding clauses that imply the negation of these states. Each time a new frame is added, any clauses that are relatively inductive, i.e., hold in both a frame and in the next frame, are propagated forward to the new frame.
pIC3 defines Safe States as the states that can never reach ¬φ, and attempts to build an invariant that implies Safe States. This invariant represents an overapproximation of P ost * (I) ∩ ¬Pre * (¬φ). We construct the invariant by building a series of frames F 0 , ..., F k ⊆ S, which represent an over-approximation of the set of states reachable within 0, ..., k steps that can not reach ¬φ within k steps, formally (Post
At the end of the kth iteration of the main loop, the state space will be partitioned as shown in Figure 1 .
We will illustrate our method on the simple explicit 4-state system, shown in Figure 2 . We initialise the frames with F 0 = I, as this is exactly the set of states reachable within 0 steps, and F 1 = φ, as this is the biggest approximation possible of states reachable within 1 step that do not violate φ. Frames are constructed and modified via two processes: propagation of inductive clauses, and frame refinement by removal of violating states and generalisations of the violating states. We will first talk about frame refinement.
Frame refinement Consider that we have added a frame F k , which is the best over-approximation we have of the Safe States reachable within k steps. In this stage of the algorithm, we remove any state s ∈ F k that can reach ¬φ within one step via the transition relation T . For each state s ∈ F k that can reach ¬φ in one step, we remove all states t ∈ F k−1 that can reach s within one step via T , and for each state t ∈ F k−1 , we remove all states r ∈ F k−2 that can reach t within one step via T , and so on. The states we remove are CTIs. By this method, we can remove all states in P re k (¬φ). In Figure 3 , the SAT solver has returned the one-step transition from s(10) to s(11) and so we remove state s(10) from frame F 1 .
We remove the states by adding boolean clauses to the frames that imply the negation of the state, i.e., to remove state s, we add a clause c =⇒ ¬s. We could use c = ¬s, but, in fact, we hope to be able to find a sub-clause of ¬s, which is inductive relative to our frames and will remove a set of s-like states. We elaborate this step next.
Clause generalisation Consider Figure 4 , which shows a fragment of a DTMC (the states inside frame F k−2 and the states that have already been removed from frames are not shown). Suppose the SAT solver returns the state s(100). The negation of this state, ¬x 1 ∨ x 2 ∨ x 3 is inductive relative to F 0 , ..., F k , because the state has no predecessors. We wish to generalize from this information, and so we look to see if there are variables in the clause that can be inverted while the clause remains inductive, and thus can be assigned "don't care". Consider ¬x 1 ∨ x 2 ∨ ¬x 3 . This is not inductive relative to F k−1 because state s(101) has a predecessor in frame F k−1 , so we cannot drop variable x 3 . Now consider ¬x 1 ∨ ¬x 2 ∨ x 3 . This is inductive relative to F 0 , ..., F k because the state s(110) has no predecessors. We can hence use the clause c = ¬x 1 ∨ x 3 .
s (110) s (001) s (101) s (100) s(111) The effectiveness of the generalisation depends on the connectivity of the state graph and its encoding, and is key to IC3 being able to handle large state spaces symbolically. The original IC3 algorithm implements a generalisation procedure that finds a minimal inductive clause [5] , and further work improves this by extracting information from the counterexamples to generalization [12] . We implement a simple "greedy" generalization scheme for pIC3, where we attempt to drop each variable of the clause in sequence, and drop the first one that gives an inductive sub-clause. This approach is sub-optimal, but is nevertheless better than taking c = ¬s and removing only one state at a time.
Clause propagation When we add the first frame F 1 , we take the largest possible over-approximation because we have no additional information. For all subsequent frames, we have additional information in the form of states we have removed from previous frames. When we add a frame F k+1 , we start with the largest over-approximation of F k+1 = φ, and then we look one by one at the clauses in the frames F 1 , ..., F k and see whether they can be propagated forward to the next frames. We propagate relatively inductive clauses, i.e., a clause c in F i that holds in F i+1 will be added to F i+1 . Note that if we have added clauses in the frame refinement stage that eliminate states that have predecessors and so potentially are part of P ost * (I), the clauses will fail to propagate to the new frame, until k is big enough that we have found all the predecessors.
Building Danger States
In the previous section we have described how by making SAT calls we find states that are in P re * (¬φ). When the SAT solver returns a CTI in the form of an explicit state and transition to a successor state, we remove the state from Safe States, as described above, and we add both states to an explicit list of Danger States. As we find each state we incrementally construct an SMT problem made up of upper and lower bounds for P r[♦¬φ | s] ∀s ∈ Danger States with the information we have about Danger States. These upper and lower bounds are a system of linear inequalities derived from the partial knowledge of the system of linear equations that is used to calculate reachability probabilities in existing probabilistic model checking algorithms [3] .
When we find that I is in P re * (¬φ), i.e., we have found at least one complete path in Danger Paths, we check whether we have enough information to prove or refute the property yet, i.e., whether all solutions to P r[♦¬φ | I] are guaranteed to be one side of the probability threshold.
Probability bounds In Section 2.2 we showed that P r[♦¬φ | I] can be expressed as path probabilities. We can extend this result to write upper and lower bounds, U p (s) and L p (s), for P r[♦¬φ | s] in terms of path probabilities. The lower bound can be written as follows:
In other words, either ¬φ is reached within one step, i.e., by a transition s to u ∈ ¬φ, or by a transition to a state t ∈ S \ ¬φ, from which a path to ¬φ is taken. This corresponds to all path fragments, where all states (except the last one) are not part of ¬φ [3] . There is a unique solution to L p (I), because all states in Danger States are backward reachable from ¬φ, and all states in ¬φ have L p (s) = U p (s) = 1.
The sum of the probabilities on transitions leaving any state must equal one, so we can obtain an upper bound for all s ∈ Danger States. There is a unique solution to U p (I), because there is a unique solution to L p (s).
We do not explicitly compute the values for L p (s) and U p (s), but instead incrementally construct the SMT problem described above, adding more constraints as we find each transition. This allows us to make use of the incremental solving capabilities of Z3. Representation of the upper and lower bounds as a system of linear inequalities allows compact representation of paths that contain loops, or multiple paths containing the same states and transitions.
Note that the SMT problem includes only transitions we have explicitly found with SAT calls, and so is incomplete unless we reach final termination.
In Figure 3 , the SAT solver has returned the transition from s(10) to s(11). P (s, s ′ ) gives the transition probability p which in our example is equal to 0.2. We now know that the lower bound for P r[♦¬φ | s] is the transition probability p multiplied by the lower bound for P r[♦¬φ | s ′ ], i.e., 0.2 · L p (s (11)). We also know the upper bound for P r[♦¬φ | s] is p · P r[♦¬φ | s ′ ] + (1 − p), because the worst-case scenario is that all remaining, not yet found, transitions from s lead directly to ¬φ. In our example U p (s(01)) = 0.8 + 0.2 · U p (s(11)).
We make two calls to the SMT solver: the first one checks whether the reachability probability is guaranteed below the threshold y, by adding the assertion U p (I) < y; the second call checks whether the reachability probability is guaranteed above the threshold y, by adding the assertion L p (I) ≥ y.
If U p (I) < y is not satisfiable then P r[♦¬φ | I] ≥ y, whereas if L p (I) ≥ y is not satisfiable P r[♦¬φ | I] < y and the property holds. We call both of these cases "early termination".
However, if we have found the complete set of Danger States and all transitions between them, then the lower bound will equal the upper bound for every state: in this case the reachability property is the unique solution to the system of linear equations. We call this "final termination".
Detecting loops
We use incremental SAT solving to find any not-yet-found transitions in T between explicitly known states in Danger States, thus finding any loops in the Danger Paths we have found so far. We may choose the frequency with which to run this search, e.g., every iteration, or only every N th iteration, or we may omit this step completely and find the loops after we have found an invariant that implies φ \ Pre * (¬φ). In our experimental evaluation, we do the latter, as we find it gives marginally quicker run times with the model we are using.
Adding information from Danger States to the system of linear inequalities IC3 terminates when it has produced an invariant that implies φ, or it has found a counterexample path from I to ¬φ. pIC3 terminates when it has found enough Danger States to prove or refute the property. It is possible that pIC3 may find an invariant that implies φ \ Pre * (¬φ) before this happens. At this point, we know we have found the full symbolic set of Danger States, but we may not have added enough information about the transitions within Danger States to our system of linear inequalities.
In this case, pIC3 uses incremental SAT solving to extract information from the symbolically represented Danger States, in the form of transitions in T that we have not yet discovered, and adds the information to the system of linear inequalities. We do this until we have enough information to terminate.
If we have added every transition within Danger States to the system of linear inequalities, we have a full set of linear equations to solve where U p (s) = L p (s) for every state. This will give us an exact answer for P r[♦¬φ | I]. It is, however, unlikely that we will reach this full set of linear equations without being able to prove or refute the property at an earlier stage.
Refine frames: remove P re k (¬φ) from F k and add to DangerStates. 
Proof of correctness
State space partitioning
In Section 3 we have given an overview of how we partition the state space using an IC3-like technique. We reach this state space partitioning by constructing regions Safe States in the same manner as the original IC3, and by defining Danger States to be S \ (¬φ ∪ Safe States). In order to build Safe States, we incrementally construct an invariant that implies (Post * (I) ∩ ¬Pre * (¬φ)), by building a series of frames F 0 , ..., F k , where
To do this, the following program invariants must hold [4] ).
As we remove the states in Pre n (¬φ), we add them to Danger States. This gives us a new program invariant, specific to pIC3. This ensures that Danger States only contains states that are part of Danger Paths or that are unreachable from I.
Danger States⊆ Pre
* (¬φ) ∩ φ and Danger States ∩ F i = ∅
The state space is correctly partitioned when we reach a frame closed under the transition relation, i.e., F k = F k+1 . Together, these four invariants and reaching F k = F k+1 guarantee a correct state space partitioning.
Bounds on reachability probabilities
In Section 3.2, we have given the formula for the upper and lower bounds on the reachability probabilities for states in Danger States, provided requirements for "early termination", and defined "final termination", which occurs after F k = F k+1 . This gives us four more program invariants necessary for a correct result on termination.
6. L p ≤ P r[♦¬φ|s] : ∀s ∈ Danger States 7. U p ≥ P r[♦¬φ|s] : ∀s ∈ Danger States 8. L p only ever increases 9. U p only ever decreases Correctness Proposition 1. Altogether, program invariants (1) to (9) and termination yield total correctness of the algorithm. Consequently, we show that our algorithm is correct by showing that the invariants hold throughout the pseudo-code and that it terminates. The proof that the invariants hold can be found in Appendix A. (2), and the fact that k is an index, dictate that the frame sequence is non-decreasing. Then, due to the check F k = F k+1 , the sequence must be strictly increasing until termination. As the transition system is finite, F k = F k+1 must be obtained in finite time.
Termination Lemma 1 Invariant
Lemma 2 Once F k = F k+1 , we build the full set of linear equations for the upper and lower bounds in Danger States. There are a finite number of states in Danger States, and each state has a finite number of transitions. Thus we can obtain a full set of linear equations in finite time.
Proposition 2. By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 and the fact that a set of linear equations is solvable in polynomial time, it is guaranteed that"final termination" will occur in finite time.
Note that the algorithm will terminate "early" if the probability bounds show that P r[♦¬φ | I] is guaranteed to be on one side of the threshold.
Experimental results and discussion
Implementation
We implement pIC3 in C++, following the pseudocode in Appendix A. We use MiniSat 2.2.0 and Z3 4.4.2 for incremental SAT and SMT solving.
We input models directly as clausal transition relations, and do not explore the challenge of model encoding. Our experiments have shown that the performance of pIC3 is highly dependent on the encoding of the model, with a poor encoding causing models to run as much as 10 times slower. We note that in order to run PRISM benchmarks it is possible to generate CNF from the BDD transition relations generated by PRISM, as in [1, 6] .
In order to assess the performance of pIC3 over varying model size, we construct a model where we can increase the states without changing the regularity of the structure of the model (we know that the regularity will affect both the performance of PRISM and pIC3). This model is an aggregation of multiple models of Knuth's dice [14] with the properties that the probability of all, or a set number, of the dice rolling a number 6 is below a certain threshold. We build identical models for PRISM and run the same experiments.
We conducted the experimental evaluation on a 12-core 2.40 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2440 with 96 GB of RAM and Linux OS. We limit experimental run time to 24 hours and use the Linux time command to measure this for pIC3. We compare to PRISM 4.3.1, running the hybrid engine, and take the verification times for PRISM from the program output, omitting model construction time.The properties we use are P <y [F ¬φ], and we run experiments on each model for a y for which the property holds, and a y for which the property does not hold. We pick y to be within 0.1 of the actual probability of reaching ¬φ. We show the number of ¬φ states in the table.
Experimental results show that PRISM performs consistently well regardless of the number of bad states for models up to 10 9 states, and is equally fast to pass or fail a property, and generally faster than pIC3. However, pIC3 is faster than PRISM for large models with smaller numbers of ¬φ states, and can evaluate some models with 10 10 states. This is because the performance of pIC3 is not dependent on the size of the model, but the number of CTIs that need to be removed. This is proportional to the number of Danger States required to prove or refute the property. However, as the number of ¬φ states and Danger Paths increases, the time taken for pIC3 to prove or refute a property increases well beyond the time PRISM takes. To improve scalability, we need to reduce the number of CTIs that must be removed. Generalising to find minimal inductive clauses from CTIs [5] will help this, but in future work we plan to explore pre-processing steps towards counter-example minimisation, such as those used in [19] .
In summary the experimental results show that, whilst pIC3 is not a fast choice for small systems where the set of Danger States is a large proportion of the total state space, it is able to tackle models where PRISM fails, and can be well-suited to the verification of rare-events. 
Related Work
Probabilistic IC3 is based on the IC3 algorithm proposed in [4] which tackles finite state non-probabilistic finite state systems. IC3 has been extended to SMT [13] , and applied to infinite state systems [9] using predicate abstraction, implemented in NuXmv [7] . The IC3 framework has, however, not yet been extended to probabilistic models, which is the key contribution of this work.
The current standard for probabilistic model checking is PRISM [16] . PRISM contains four main engines, based on MTBDDs, BDDs, sparse matrices, and explicit-state methods. The default engine enabled is the hybrid engine, which uses a combination of symbolic and explicit state data structures. The PRISM website states that PRISM can handle models of roughly 10 8 states, depending on the structure of the model, and the number of distinct probabilities.
SAT-based model checking techniques have been extended to probabilistic systems. Stochastic SMT (SSMT) was first proposed by [10] , who introduced randomised quantifiers to predicates in SMT. The original paper uses SSMT to consider bounded reachability in probabilistic automata, which is an incomplete technique. The approach is, however, more general than that, and can be applied easily to other properties, and has been integrated with Craig Interpolation [17] . SSMT is a very different approach to pIC3, and builds on the idea of lazy form of quantifier elimination to compute reachable sets. We have not compared per-formance of our approach to SSMT as the available SSMT implementation uses the bounded model checking (BMC) framework and, as such, is incomplete.
Our work is closely related to work on generation of counter-examples for Markov chains. The original work in this area [11] applies k-shortest-path algorithms to Markov chains, and then computes a counterexample made up of the minimum number of paths. This method requires explicit state representation and so does not scale well to larger systems. Bounded Model Checking has been used to generate counter-examples for Markov chains [6] . As mentioned previously, there are several advantages to using IC3 over BMC: IC3 unrolls the transition relation only one step; it makes much more effective use of incremental SAT solving than BMC; and the reasoning in IC3 is localised and driven by the property being checked. The paper mentions obtaining incomplete assignments from a SAT solver, although it is not clear if they implement this. This is similar to the generalisation procedure in pIC3. Their method requires computing the length of the shortest counter-example path using the OBDDs, and so is limited to models that are small enough for this to be possible.
Similarly, [19] generate counter-examples for Markov chains in the form of a minimal-critical subsystem. The subsystem can be considered similar to the Danger States in pIC3, and they also use an SMT solver to solve a system of linear equations expressing the reachability probability, but they solve the system for ALL states in the system and introduce boolean variables for each state to identify the relevant states for the property. pIC3 partitions out the relevant state-space using IC3-like techniques, and then solves a much smaller SMT problem. The authors also solve the same problem using Mixed Integer Linear Programming and introduce optimizations that may benefit pIC3, such as introducing constraints based on SCCs. Counter example minimisation is tackled for Markov Chains [2] by abstracting away details of strongly connected components by replacing with edges that have a probability of walking through the SCC. It may be possible to apply this method to pIC3 as a pre-processing step.
Conclusions and further work
We have developed and implemented a probabilistic model checking algorithm for bounded probabilistic reachability properties, based on incremental construction of inductive invariants and a system of linear inequalities, and shown it is sound and complete. We have run pIC3 on a series of models of increasing size and found that pIC3 can verify rare events in systems too large for PRISM to handle.
In future work we aim to increase the scalability to systems that require larger numbers of counter-examples to prove or refute properties, by exploring techniques in [19] , and by improving the generalisation of CTIs. Use of incremental SAT solving in IC3 is still an active area of research, and should be explored further for pIC3. In addition, like the original IC3, our algorithm is well-suited to parallel computation [4] 
A Further proofs and pseudo-code
We give pseudocode for our implementation of pIC3, and demonstrate that the program invariants in Section 4 hold in each part. main() The top level function of pIC3 is shown in Figure 5 . In addition to initialising the series of frames, pIC3 begins by initialising the upper and lower probability bounds. We will look at the functions extendFrontier, propagateClauses and checkTermination in more detail, but first consider whether the program invariants hold after initialisation, at line 8: (2) and (3) holds as, I =⇒ φ by the check in line 2, and F 1 = φ.
-invariant (4) is required to hold from frame F 1 onwards.
-invariant (5) holds as Danger States is empty -invariants (6), (7) hold by the initialisation as 0 and 1 -invariants (8), (9) hold as no changes have been made extendFrontier() Assume we are in iteration k of the algorithm and frames F 0 , ..., F k satisfy the program invariants (1)- (9) . First a new frame F k+1 = φ is added, as the largest possible over-approximation of states reachable in k steps that does not violate φ. Now we need to make the program invariants hold again.
-invariant (1) is not affected -invariant(3) holds by construction -invariant (2) will hold in the end, since we will modify frames only by adding the same clause to all frames F 0 , .., F i for some i.
becomes the crucial part of this function: if invariant (4) holds, the function returns without taking other actions. If it does not hold, it must be preserved by removing the state in F k that has a transition that leads outside of F i+1 . Thus the removeCTI function must remove the counterexample to induction (CTI) whilst preserving the other program invariants.
-program invariants(5)-(9) must be preserved by UpdateProbability.
removeCTI() The occurrence of a CTI s in the frame F k can have 2 reasons: -s is reachable from I, and part of a counter-example path -it is not yet discovered that s is not reachable from I.
We avoid differentiating between these cases, and remove s from F k and add s to Danger States regardless. We pay a slight overhead cost for this of maintaining an upper and lower bound for P[♦¬φ | s] for unreachable states that do not contribute to P[♦¬φ | I]. We remove the states with backwards search.
We build a queue of states to remove, and each entry < q, i > tells us to remove state q from frame F i . We first check that we cannot reach q from I, if we can then we have found a complete counter-example path and we add q to Danger States and return to the main function. If we cannot, then we add a clause c =⇒ ¬q to F 1 , ..., F j where F j is the outermost frame where c is inductive. Adding the clause removes q from each frame. The clause c is an inductive generalisation of ¬q.
If j ≥ i − 1, we have successfully removed q. If not, we get the predecessor of q, add that to the queue of states to remove. We also add q to the list of states to remove, as it may have other predecessors and not be fully removed yet. We repeat this until the queue is empty. Now consider the program invariants at the end of removeCTI():
-invariant (1) holds as no changes are made to frame F 0 -invariant (2) is not violated as clauses are added to all frames F 0 ...F i for some i. -invariant (3) holds as the formula for the frames are only ever extended, and thus only ever become stricter. -invariant (4) is enforced as predecessors are revealed and enqueued to be deleted and added to Danger States. -invariant(5) holds as states added to Danger States are found to be predecessors to ¬φ and states are only added to Danger States as they are removed from the frames. -for program invariants (6) to (9) we must look at the updateProbability function.
updateProbability() The updateProbability function incrementally constructs the upper and lower bounds for P[♦¬φ | s] for all s ∈ Danger States.
-program invariants (1) to (5) are unaffected -program invariants (6) and (8) are true. We add transitions as we find them to the upper and lower bounds, building a subset of transitions that all lead to ¬φ. All states in Danger States are connected to ¬φ by this chain of transitions, and so there are no bottom strongly connected components, and the upper and lower bounds have a unique solution. We know the sum of the transition probabilities of the transitions we have not found yet, and for the upper bound we assume all these transitions connect to states in ¬φ, so have a probability mass of 1. For the lower bound we assume all these transitions connect to states with a probability mass of 0. The check in line 2 ensures we only add each transition once. We only add to L p , and so L p can only increase.
1: function removeCTI 2: states = { s, k } 3:
while states not empty do 4:
{ q, i } = pop element of states ⊲ the inner-most 5:
if SAT (F0 ∧ T ∧ ¬q ∧ q ′ ) then 6: updateProbabilty(I,q) 7:
Fi := Fi ∧ ¬q ⊲ remove q, not I 8:
end if 10:
j:= maximal j for which SAT (Fj ∧ T ∧ ¬q ∧ q ′ ) 11:
c:= inductiveGeneralisation(¬q) 12:
for l from 0 to j + 1 do 13:
F l := F l ∧ c 14:
end for 15:
if j ≥ i − 
